The French Political Permacrisis: The Dawn of a New Political Reality
In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he became the fifth UK leader to occupy the position in six years.
Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its fifth premier in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?
The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his administration's continuation.
But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for decades – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.
Governing Without a Majority
Essential context: from the moment Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three opposing factions – left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.
Simultaneously, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.
In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In mid-September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.
To such an extent that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.
Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.
Macron honored his word – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.
With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, due on Thursday.
It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”
A Cultural Shift
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.
A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.
To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.
Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look grim.
So is there a way out? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.
An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.
Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.
In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”